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ABSTRACT 
North Korea began its involvement in illicit activities 
in the 1970s, but it took the United States until the new 
millennium to develop a series of major law enforcement 
approaches to counter these activities.  North Korea’s 
illicit activities are purportedly the funding input for the 
development of its nuclear weapons program, which 
constitutes the output.  The main illicit activities to be 
discussed include drug production and trafficking, the 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency, cigarettes and 
pharmaceuticals, missile sales and human trafficking.  The 
United States has aggressively addressed the nuclear threat 
that North Korea poses, but has been slow to address the 
inputs that fund the outputs.   
This thesis seeks to answer the question of why it took 
the United States over three decades to address the illicit 
activities of North Korea that purportedly fund its nuclear 
program.    
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I. NORTH KOREAN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
A. PURPOSE 
North Korea began its involvement in illicit activities 
in the 1970s, but it took the United States until the new 
millennium to develop a series of major law enforcement 
approaches to counter these activities.  North Korea’s 
illicit activities are purportedly the funding input for the 
development of its nuclear weapons program, which 
constitutes the output.  The main illicit activities to be 
discussed include drug production and trafficking, the 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency, cigarettes and 
pharmaceuticals, missile sales and human trafficking.  The 
United States has aggressively addressed the nuclear threat 
that North Korea poses, but has been slow to address the 
inputs that fund the outputs.   
This thesis seeks to answer the question of why it took 
the United States over three decades to address the illicit 
activities of North Korea that purportedly fund its nuclear 
program.  This thesis will begin by examining the evolution 
of North Korea’s illicit activities, the types of activities 
in which it is involved, and the estimated amounts of money 
that have potentially been contributed to its nuclear 
program.  Secondly, it will examine the evolution of U.S. 
policy toward North Korea, followed by the reaction of the 
U.S. policy apparatus to its illicit activities.  This 
examination will review the different approaches of recent 
administrations, and the current debate over whether a 
strong diplomatic approach or a strong law enforcement 
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approach would be more effective.  Thirdly, these findings 
will be used to analyze the various U.S. policy options that 
could either dissuade or disable North Korea from further 
engaging in illicit activities.  Finally, it will assess the 
reasons why the United States has not more heavily focused 
on the illicit activities that purportedly fund North 
Korea’s nuclear program until the new millennium. 
B. BACKGROUND 
North Korea has a decades-long history of being 
involved in illicit activities that purportedly fund its 
nuclear weapons program.  While many countries around the 
world are involved in illicit activities, North Korea’s 
involvement and subsequent profits present a unique threat 
to not only Northeast Asian security, but global security.  
Its illicit activities, to include drug production and 
trafficking, the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, 
pharmaceuticals and cigarettes, and human trafficking, 
produce an estimated $1 billion annual profit for the North 
Korean regime.1  The unique threat that these profits 
present to regional security is that they are purportedly 
funneled into the research and development, production, and 
trafficking of ballistic missiles, missile base technology 
and nuclear-related technology.  The technology and weapons 
developed from the profits of illicit activities go beyond 
use in just North Korea’s inventory.  North Korea has 
exported its technology to countries which could potentially 
deploy the weapons for their own use, or resell them, adding 
                     
1 Raphael Perl and Dick K. Nanto, “North Korea Crime for Profit 
Activities,” Congressional Research Service, RL33885, February 16, 2007, 
2. 
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to the proliferation challenge.  The United States’ and 
regional reactions to this problem and their efficacy will 
be discussed, followed by future policy options and their 
potential consequences.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
Past research on North Korea’s illicit activities 
focused on discussing the types of activities and estimated 
amounts of money that North Korea earns, as well as what 
U.S. policy options are available to curb these activities.  
More recent research concentrates on the newer issues of how 
law enforcement approaches have been integrated into U.S. 
foreign policy toward North Korea, and how to strike an 
effective balance between diplomacy and law enforcement.   
An official debate as to whether or not North Korea is 
involved in illicit activities does not exist.  However, 
many analysts have performed comparative studies about the 
monetary figures and volume of illicit trade figures which 
yield estimates, due to the difficulty of determining exact 
numbers because of North Korea’s isolation.  These analysts’ 
differing assessments constitute the current debate which 
revolves around the type of approach which should be taken 
toward curbing North Korea’s illicit activities.  While 
there is wide debate about how the United States should 
approach North Korea, there is less literature involving the 
specifics of illicit activities.  More broadly, there exists 
a sharp divide in the U.S. government as to whether a 
confrontational or an engagement strategy should be pursued 
toward North Korea in response to the myriad of threats 
which the country presents to the region.  It is this 
broader debate and current policy that fuels differing views 
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on how to deal with North Korea’s illicit activities.  This 
debate is shaped by the arguments of two sides: the 
hardliners and the moderates. 
In regard to U.S. policy toward North Korea, the 
hardliners’ beliefs are shaped by the idea that negotiation 
with a “rogue nation,” or one considered part of the “axis 
of evil” is not an option.2  Hardliner views include that 
regime change should be a high priority, and that 
negotiation with North Korea will not produce the desired 
results.3  They criticize those favoring only diplomatic 
measures, dialogue, and financial incentives to coax North 
Korea into cooperation, and blame moderates for giving in to 
North Korean blackmail tactics.  Hardliners argue that 
maintaining the decades old economic embargo will bring down 
Kim Chong Il, and that “regime change is the only way to end 
the threat from North Korea.”4  They “see a more 
confrontational strategy as the best way to pursue a 
conclusion to the situation on the peninsula.”5 
More specific to illicit activities, they believe that 
addressing the inputs (illicit activities) will disable 
                     
2 Mike Chinoy, “North Korea: Confront or Engage?” Cable News Network, 
December 13, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/13/nkorea.dilemma/ind
ex.html (accessed August 5, 2007). 
3  Bernard Gwerztman, “Council’s North Korea Expert:  U.S. Needs More 
Negotiating Flexibility to Achieve Accord on Ending North Korea’s 
Nuclear Arms Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 2, 2003, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/6224/councils_north_korea_expert.html 
(accessed July 3, 2007). 
4 “North Korea Plans To Build Light-Water Reactors,” Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, December 20, 2005, 
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005/12/20/3bb5f35e-5961-4cf1-b66a-
63fa735440fb.html (accessed July 2, 2007). 
5 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang. Nuclear North Korea:  A Debate on 
Engagement Strategies. (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003), 4. 
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North Korea from producing outputs (a nuclear weapons 
program).  For this reason, hardliners favor an aggressive, 
non-negotiable approach to contain North Korea’s illicit 
activities through law enforcement pressure.  A recent 
example that upsets hardliners is that North Korean funds 
totaling $24 million dollars were unfrozen at Banco Delta 
Asia, a Macao bank investigated for facilitating North 
Korea’s illicit transactions.  Because the “North Koreans 
have said publicly that they will not comply with the 
bilateral agreement until the Banco Delta Asia funds are 
safely under their control,” the funds were unfrozen to 
bring North Korea back to the Six Party Talks negotiation 
table.6  Hardliners argue that the use of Section 311 of the 
Patriot Act, which targets foreign banks that facilitate 
illicit activities, had been successful, until the lifting 
of the freeze, by putting pressure on the international 
financial community to not engage in North Korea’s illicit 
transactions.  Consequently, hardliners believe that not 
enforcing Section 311 will diminish its legitimacy.7   
John Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise 
Institute and the former Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, is among the most vocal 
of hardliners.  He criticized the return of these funds, as 
well as the Bush administration’s allowance of a visit by 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill to North 
                     
6 John R. Bolton, “Pyongyang’s Perfidy,” American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy, May 18, 2007, 
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.foreign,pubID.26203/pub_detail.as
p (accessed August 8, 2007). 
7 Farah Stockman, “Debate Swirls Over Fiscal Pinch on North Korea, 
Iran,” The Boston Globe, June 18, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/06/18/debate_
swirls_over_fiscal_pinch_on_n_korea_iran/ (accessed July 2, 2007). 
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Korea.  John Bolton stated that Hill’s “Pyongyang visit 
symbolizes the full return of Clinton-era, bilateral 
negotiations with North Korea” and that Kim Chong Il is 
stalling to wait for “America’s 2008 elections, when the 
Clinton era may return.”8  Additionally, he argues that 
retreating from a tough stance will send “a bad signal to 
North Korea, and it is a bad signal to Iran.”9  He claims 
that the freezing of funds was the leverage that the United 
States held over North Korea, which was negated, and this 
“quid pro quo is not only embarrassing, it sets a dangerous 
precedent for other regimes that would blackmail the United 
States.”10 
Despite John Bolton’s criticism, hardliners generally 
favor the tougher stance of the Bush administration compared 
to the Clinton administration’s use of negotiation and aid 
to lure North Korea into compliance with agreements and 
treaties.  One such hardliner who is critical of the Clinton 
administration’s approach is Chuck Downs, an Institute for 
Corean-American Studies fellow (ICAS, Inc.) and former 
senior official of the Pentagon and State Department.11  
Chuck Downs’ belief is that the Clinton years of giving 
                     
8 Both quotes in this sentence come from the following article:  John 
R. Bolton, “Pyongyang Pussyfooting,” American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, July 3, 2007, 
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.foreign,pubID.26441/pub_detail.as
p (accessed August 8, 2007). 
9 Bill Gertz, “Bolton Hits Agreement as Bad Signal to Iran,” The 
Washington Times, February 14, 2007, www.iranfocus.com (accessed August 
4, 2007). 
10 John R. Bolton, “Pyongyang’s Perfidy,” American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy, May 18, 2007, 
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.foreign,pubID.26203/pub_detail.as
p (accessed August 8, 2007). 
11 The job title for Chuck Downs was found on:  
http://www.icasinc.org/bios/downs_c.html, (accessed August 7, 2007). 
 7
chances to North Korea only empowered it because the 
administration “premised its policy on the belief that North 
Korean behavior will be moderated by the regime’s fear of 
impending collapse, and its eagerness to attain certain 
benefits – including the huge amounts of aid that the 
administration has extended to the regime.”12 
The other side of the debate about how to address North 
Korea is comprised of the moderates.  The moderates argue 
that the U.S. policy toward North Korea should include a 
strategy that engages the country, and believes that “we’re 
never going to get anywhere by further trying to isolate a 
regime that is already the most isolated on the planet.”13  
This side views North Korea as a “victim of great power 
politics” and that the United States has a responsibility to 
negotiate a resolution to the nuclear crisis.14  In regard 
to the North Korean bank account freeze, some moderates 
believe that increasing law enforcement pressure on North 
Korea will derail diplomatic options, and such containment 
could become an obstacle to future dialogue and negotiations 
on the nuclear issue.  Additionally, applying too much 
financial pressure on North Korea may cause an economic 
implosion of the regime that could cause it to act 
irrationally, and potentially threaten the security of the 
                     
12 Chuck Downs, “North Korea – U.S. Relations:  Issues and Answers,” 
The ICAS Lectures, No. 2000-0211-ChD, Winter Lecture Symposium,: Asia’s 
Challenges Ahead, University of Pennsylvania, February 11, 2000, 
http://www.icasinc.org/2000/2000w/2000wchd.html (accessed August 7, 
2007). 
13 Mike Chinoy, “North Korea: Confront or Engage?” Cable News 
Network, December 13, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/13/nkorea.dilemma/ind
ex.html  (accessed August 5, 2007). 
14 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang. Nuclear North Korea:  A Debate on 
Engagement Strategies. (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003), 5. 
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region.  By not engaging North Korea both diplomatically and 
economically to address the “underlying economic and 
security conditions that have led Pyongyang down the nuclear 
path, the world is inevitably going to face another North 
Korea crisis.”15 
Victor Cha, a moderate, and the former Director for 
Asian Affairs of the National Security Council, argues that 
“engagement should be the desired strategy for ‘hawks’ 
(hardliners) because this is the best practical way to build 
a coalition for punishment tomorrow.”16  If the United 
States allows North Korea to have a stake in its future by 
providing it opportunities to become engaged both 
politically and economically in a positive manner in the 
region, it may feel more compelled to cooperate in order not 
to face negative consequences.  Along the lines of 
engagement, Victor Cha suggests that “lifting sanctions, 
letting the North gain what little it can from new 
opportunities thus made available, and then using the 
possibility of reinstating sanctions as a potential stick 
later, is more likely to elicit changes in behavior.”17  By 
precluding North Korea from having any stake in its future, 
it has no encouragement to cooperate.  Moreover, if the 
region sees the United States extending opportunities for 
North Korea to change, and “should engagement fail, the 
                     
15 Robert M. Hathaway, “Supping with the Devil,” World Policy 
Journal, (Winter 2003-04), 87, 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-4/hathaway.pdf 
(accessed August 8, 2007). 
16 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang. Nuclear North Korea:  A Debate on 
Engagement Strategies. (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003), 89.  
17 Ibid., 92. 
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United States would be far better situated to enlist other 
regional players in tightening the screws on Pyongyang.”18  
Another vocal moderate is Jack Pritchard, the President 
of the Korea Economic Institute, and a former aide to 
President Bush, who “quit the State Department in protest 
against the Bush Administration’s reluctance to deal 
directly with North Korea.”19  Jack Pritchard has been 
critical of the Bush administration’s approach to North 
Korea because of its refusal to deal one-on-one with North 
Korea until Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill’s 
February 2007 visit to Pyongyang.   
In a press briefing while Jack Pritchard was the 
Director of Asian Affairs for the National Security Council 
during the Clinton administration, it was evident why he 
would not agree with the current administration’s no-
dialogue position toward North Korea.  He stated that “it 
cannot be understated how much the North Koreans ultimately 
value, and will depend upon a more normal relationship with 
the United States.”20  If North Korea wants a relationship 
with the United States, but cannot get its attention, what 
option does it have other than to call negative attention to 
                     
18 Robert M. Hathaway, “Supping with the Devil,” World Policy 
Journal, (Winter 2003-04), 87, 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-4/hathaway.pdf 
(accessed August 8, 2007). 
19 Bernard Gwertzman, “Pritchard:  Latest Talks on North Korea 
‘Successful’ Due to Major Changes by United States,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, August 8, 2005, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8597/pritchard.html?jsessionid=1315fd3d3b
76f72333b3bb2f841e0f27, (accessed August 8, 2007). 
20 Jack Pritchard and Larry Summers, “Press Briefing by Jack 
Pritchard and Larry Summers,” Tokyo, Japan, Office of the Press 
Secretary, November 20, 1998, 
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/112098-press-briefing-by-jack-
pritchard-and-larry-summers.htm (accessed August 8, 2007). 
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itself?  In regard to its proliferation of missiles through 
sales of its indigenous weapons, he makes it clear that 
North Korea engages in such activities because they “are a 
cash-strapped nation, which accounts for some of their 
motivation for the proliferation” of missiles.21  While 
these statements were made in a briefing prior to President 
George W. Bush taking office, it is understandable why he 
would not align himself with a hardliner stance toward North 
Korea. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The application of U.S. foreign policy toward North 
Korea has evolved based on the threat that the regime’s 
activities present to the region and U.S. interests.  This 
thesis examines the evolution of North Korea’s activities, 
and the reaction of U.S. foreign policy to these activities.  
It will seek to determine how North Korea’s illicit 
activities began over three decades ago, flourishing into a 
$1 billion dollar a year business, but substantive U.S. 
policy reactions to curb these activities have only been 
implemented since 2003. 
Chapter II examines the evolution of North Korea’s 
involvement in illicit activities.  It will assess the 
economic and natural disaster phenomena that have occurred 
over the past three decades which have contributed to its 
involvement to sustain the regime, as well as fund its 
nuclear program.  The heavy involvement of the North Korean 
                     
21 Jack Pritchard and Larry Summers, “Press Briefing by Jack 
Pritchard and Larry Summers,” Tokyo, Japan, Office of the Press 
Secretary, November 20, 1998, 
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/112098-press-briefing-by-jack-
pritchard-and-larry-summers.htm (accessed August 8, 2007). 
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government contributes to its success in developing networks 
to traffic its illicit goods.  From its North Korean 
government’s Division #39, to the military and criminal 
elements, the North Korean government is involved in the 
funding, production and trafficking of illicit goods.  The 
illicit goods to be examined in this chapter include the 
production and trafficking of drugs, the counterfeiting of 
U.S. currency, cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, the sale 
missiles and missile base technology, human trafficking, and 
other illicit activities. 
Chapter III reviews the evolution of U.S. policy toward 
North Korea, beginning with a brief overview of Cold War 
policy from the Truman administration through the G. H. W. 
Bush administration.  It will then examine in more detail 
how the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations have shaped 
recent policies toward North Korea in the aftermath of its 
economic decline and natural disasters, which have 
contributed to its increased involvement in illicit 
activities.  Finally, the initiatives developed during the 
G. W. Bush administration will be presented, accompanied by 
a look at factors that could contribute to each initiative’s 
success or failure. 
Chapter IV examines the implications of North Korea’s 
illicit activities on not only itself, but on the region and 
U.S. interests.  An analysis of U.S. policy options based on 
the debate between hardliners and moderate approaches, as 
well as their potential consequences will be presented. 
Chapter V presents conclusions about the possibilities 
of why it has taken the United States three decades to  
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directly address the illicit activities of North Korea, and 
will offer prospects for the future regarding U.S. policy 
recommendations. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF NORTH KOREA’S ILLICIT 
ACTIVITIES 
A. WHY NORTH KOREA BECAME INVOLVED IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
North Korea’s involvement in illicit activities began 
to take form in the 1970s.22  A combination of problems 
resulting from the regime’s poor financial mismanagement 
drove North Korea to supplement its income.  Because North 
Korea imports double the amount of what it exports, it has 
experienced decades of trade deficits.23  For example, since 
1990, North Korea has accumulated a $10 billion trade 
deficit in its economic relations with China and South 
Korea.24  In 2003 alone, North Korea had an $835 million 
trade deficit.25  Additionally, North Korea has failed to 
pay back loans, accounting for a $12 billion accumulation of 
loan defaults, contributing to its inability to procure 
further loans on the international market.26   
North Korea’s main trading partners: China, South 
Korea, Japan, Russia and Thailand have enabled North Korea 
to survive by trading items that North Korea cannot produce 
                     
22 Raphael Perl and Dick K. Nanto, “North Korea Crime for Profit 
Activities.” Congressional Research Service, RL33885, February, 16, 
2007, 2. 
23 Dick K. Nanto, Emma Chanlett-Avery. “The North Korean Economy:  
Overview and Policy Analysis.” Congressional Research Service, RL32493, 
(April 18, 2007), 2. 
24 David L. Asher, “The North Korean Criminal State, its Ties to 
Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation,” Policy Forum 
Online, 05-92A:  November 15, 2005, 





for itself.27  While these trading partners generally trade 
legitimate goods, the opportunity for North Korea’s criminal 
elements to coordinate with the criminal elements of its 
trading partner countries arose.  These relationships are 
what have facilitated the trafficking of illicit goods 
around the world by sea, land and air.  North Korea has 
developed relationships with both Chinese and Russian 
criminal elements, facilitating the trafficking of illicit 
goods through its borders. 
The relationships between criminal elements that were 
established in the 1970s paved the way for North Korea’s 
increased involvement in illicit activities that would take 
place in the 1990s.  Since 1990, North Korea has experienced 
twelve years of intermittent floods, droughts and famines, 
which killed over two million North Koreans, and caused 
200,000 refugees to flee to China for survival.28  Because 
of North Korea’s dire economic and social situation caused 
by these natural phenomena, its involvement in illicit 
activities increased exponentially.  It was during this time 
that North Korea realized its potential to profit from its 
illegal activities, funneling those monies not into the 
sustenance of its population through food and development, 
but into the research, development, production and 
trafficking of missiles and nuclear-related technology.  
                     
27 David L. Asher, “The North Korean Criminal State, its Ties to 
Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation,” Policy Forum 
Online, 05-92A:  November 15, 2005, 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0592Asher.html (accessed May 2, 
2007). 
28 May Lee, “Famine May Have Killed Up To 2 Million in North Korea,” 
Cable News Network, August 19, 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/19/nkorea.famine/ (accessed May 6, 
2007). 
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Ironically, North Korea rejected aid from the World Food 
Program in 2005, but consistently accepts aid assistance 
from China and South Korea, to include grants, loans, fuel 
and food.29 
B. HOW NORTH KOREA MANAGES ITS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
The relationships with trafficking partners were not 
forged underground.  The North Korean government is highly 
involved in the direction of these activities, in 
particular, with oversight from the Korean Workers’ Party, 
Division #39.30  Within the Korean Workers’ Party, there 
exists an entire network of business elements, each 
conducting a specific function to facilitate illicit 
transactions.  For example, the Daesong Group, Daesong Bank 
and the Goldenstar Bank in Vienna, Austria facilitate the 
sales and trafficking of North Korea’s illicit goods.31  The 
combination of these three business elements has 20 overseas 
branches, as well as overseas assets totaling $5 billion.32   
Not only are the financial and transportation branches 
of the North Korean government involved, but agricultural 
and security elements play a large role in the production of 
the drugs that are trafficked out of the country.  As North 
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Korean agricultural production is directed by the 
government, the production of poppy seeds is likewise 
controlled.  Typically, 25 percent of agricultural 
production is diverted from food production to accommodate 
poppy fields, which are protected by armed guards of the 
North Korean security apparatus.33   
The North Korean Navy is heavily involved in the 
trafficking of illicit goods.  Because military ships 
function as an official arm of the government, navy 
operations provide an additional means to facilitate the 
smuggling of goods.34  Because the North Korean government 
fears the defection of its naval crews, the families of 
crewmembers are placed on house arrest until the return of 
the multi-purpose naval mission.35 
The droughts, floods and famines of the 1990s produced 
North Korea’s internal problems; however external factors 
contributed to its economic demise and the need to expand 
its involvement in illicit activities.  The fall of the 
Soviet Union left North Korea to its own devices following 
the termination of what little aid it did provide toward the 
end of its existence.  Additionally, as the Soviet Union 
became exposed to new market opportunities, North Korea lost 
its market share in trade, as well as an ideological partner 
and mentor.   
Because of what North Korea lacked in legitimate trade 
with its neighbors, the 1990s became the decade during which 
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it propelled itself into the illegal trade of missiles and 
rockets to close the gap.  Its expanded involvement in 
illicit activities produced large profits which became 
dedicated to the production and trafficking of rockets and 
missiles.  The high demand for weapons, coupled with North 
Korea’s need to close the economic gap that decades of 
financial mismanagement, natural disasters and geopolitical 
changes produced, created a ripe environment for illicit 
activities.   
C. TYPES OF ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IN WHICH NORTH KOREA IS 
INVOLVED 
1. Drugs 
The production and trafficking of drugs has proven to 
be a very profitable avenue for North Korea to pursue.  
Currently, North Korea is the third largest producer of 
opium, the sixth largest producer of heroin, and is a large 
producer of methamphetamines, cocaine and ecstasy.36  North 
Korea quickly realized the profit for potential during the 
1990’s for the production of opium.  Because of the high 
profit margin on these sales, opium production increased 
more than sixteen-fold from its 1992 amount of only three 
tons, to fifty tons in 1997.37   
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North Korea has a strong customer base in the Asia-
Pacific basin, illicitly exporting over 50 percent of its 
methamphetamine supply to Japan, which has over 600,000 
addicts.38  Taiwan is a consumer of North Korea’s heroin, 
which experienced a large seizure of 79 kilograms being 
smuggled into the country.39  Australia is also a consumer 
of North Korean drugs, and was involved in an incident which 
contributed to raising awareness about North Korea’s illicit 
activities after a high-profile drug seizure.   
The seizure of a North Korean ship, the Pong Su, became 
the impetus for U.S. and regional policies geared toward 
countering the smuggling of illicit goods.  In April 2003, 
the North Korean ship was attempting to deliver a heroin 
shipment of 125 kilograms with a street value of $150 
million.40  The ship was intercepted at sea, and was found 
to be registered to the Pacific island of Tuvalu, which had 
a crew of North Koreans, as well as citizens of Malaysia and 
Singapore on board.  This intercept and seizure demonstrated 
that North Korea has involved criminal elements of its Asian 
neighbors into its illicit activity ring.  This intercept 
and seizure became a high-profile incident that would 
eventually lead to a series of meetings, programs, 
initiatives and policies directed toward curtailing North 
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Korea’s ability to smuggle illicit goods. These measures 
will be further discussed in Chapter III.  
An increased profit potential has affected how the 
North Korean government influences agricultural policy.  
Because the government directs which farms produce which 
crops, and how much, it was able to shift the acreage 
allotment toward the production of poppy for opium.  For 
example, in 1992, North Korea designated only 4.3 million 
acres to poppy production.41  Only one year later, 42 
million acres of land were dedicated, and by 1994, 72 
million acres of land were diverted from food production to 
the growth of poppy seed.42 
Because the 1990s produced continual natural disasters 
such as floods and droughts, North Korea’s ability to 
produce poppy seeds was severely affected.  These natural 
phenomena, coupled with the high-profile seizure of the Pong 
Su ship used to smuggle drugs, forced North Korea to rethink 
its illicit activities strategy.  Consequently, North Korea 
directed it focus on a lower-profile activity, the 
profitable crime of counterfeiting. 
2. Counterfeiting 
North Korea’s involvement in counterfeiting similarly 
began during turbulent economic times, and has developed and 
improved according to market demands and the introduction of 
new products to counterfeit.  The counterfeiting of U.S. 
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currency, Chinese Yuan, pharmaceuticals and cigarettes are 
among North Korea’s most successful products to counterfeit 
for illicit export. 
North Korea’s philosophy toward counterfeiting U.S. 
currency is multi-faceted.  Producing and utilizing a strong 
U.S. dollar helped to maintain the regime’s legitimacy, and 
“could be justified under the juche (self-reliance) 
ideology,” because it “allowed the regime to advertise its 
anti-capitalist, anti-American credentials.”43 While 
international law interprets the counterfeiting of currency 
as an act of war, the United States has not pursued a strong 
retaliatory option, and has had a difficult time stopping 
the counterfeiting of its currency.   
The Pyongyang Trademark Printing House, established in 
1981, is responsible for the reproduction of U.S. 
currency.44  At a very profitable 40-cent production cost 
per note, North Korea exclusively counterfeits $100 bills, 
known as “supernotes.”45  Estimates indicate that North 
Korea produces and floods the global financial market with 
over $10 million a year in counterfeit U.S. currency.46  
Over $2 million of counterfeit “supernotes” were seized at 
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the Los Angeles port, demonstrating that North Korea has 
developed trafficking relationships with U.S.-based criminal 
elements.47 
The United States is not the only victim of North 
Korea’s currency counterfeiting scheme, as China suspects 
that North Korea is producing counterfeit Yuan.48  China 
faces a double threat from counterfeiting activities for two 
reasons.  First, counterfeiting the Chinese Yuan threatens 
the stability of its own currency.  Secondly, because the of 
the heavily interdependent commerce relationship between 
China and the United States, counterfeit Yuan or U.S. 
dollars have the potential to derail the already damaged 
Chinese financial system. 
North Korea’s cigarette counterfeiting activities 
involve the production of United States, British and 
Japanese cigarette brands, and have increased as other 
illicit activities have gained negative attention.49  The 
production of international cigarette brands has creatively 
followed market trends based on consumer demand.  For 
example, Camel brand cigarettes were a highly counterfeited 
item for many years.  However, as the Marlboro brand gained 
popularity, North Korea adjusted its production to the 
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Marlboro brand.50  While the destination of a majority of 
counterfeited cigarettes is to overseas markets, a portion 
of these products are sold in the country of the brand 
name’s source.  For example, estimates indicate that one 
shipping container’s worth of counterfeit cigarettes, 
measuring forty feet, is smuggled into the United States 
every month.51  International crime rings are again being 
exposed as an accomplice to North Korea’s activities.  In 
1995, a ship originating in Taiwan destined for North Korea 
was seized with cigarette paper printed with the Marlboro 
brand.52  This paper shipment was intended for use in North 
Korean counterfeit cigarettes, which contained enough paper 
wrappers to have an estimated street value of $1 billion.53 
A third product targeted for counterfeiting is 
pharmaceuticals.  As the agricultural department directs the 
allocation of farm fields for the production of poppy, the 
government similarly directs the health department’s 
legitimate pharmaceutical companies to allocate a portion of 
their production to counterfeit medications.   
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3. Human Trafficking 
North Korea’s active involvement in the trafficking of 
people has earned it a Tier 3 ranking on the U.S. Department 
of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report.54  A Tier 3 rank 
has been placed on North Korea’s activities because the 
country neither satisfies the “minimum standards, nor 
demonstrates a significant effort to come into compliance” 
to eliminate human trafficking.55   
Human trafficking from North Korea focuses on providing 
its neighboring Chinese province of Jilin with men, women 
and children for a number of services and reasons.56  Girl 
children and women are trafficked for the purpose of 
marriage and sexual exploitation, while men, women and 
children are trafficked as forced labor in factories and 
other labor-intensive jobs.  North Korea sells its citizens 
to Chinese trafficking agents for a price ranging from $50 - 
$625, and estimates indicate that approximately 50,000 North 
Koreans are currently living in China as trafficked 
peoples.57 
While North Korea holds the blame for trafficking its 
own citizens for profit, the recipient country’s demand is 
equally culpable.  China’s one-child policy and preference 
for male children results in high rates of female 
infanticide, contributing to the high demand for women.  
Because this demand exists throughout China, and Jilin 
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province neighbors an impoverished and corrupt North Korean 
regime that is willing to supply the demand, an end to this 
illicit activity is a human rights challenge. 
While Chinese social conditions demand the need for 
North Korean marriage partners, objects of sexual 
exploitation and hard laborers, the Chinese government 
further complicates the plight of these victims by not 
granting them legal status.  Trafficked North Koreans hold 
no legal, work or protective rights while they work and 
reside in China, which jeopardizes their safety and 
security.58  Coincidentally, China was a signatory to a 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, which prohibits it from forcing human trafficked 
persons and refugees back to their home country.59  However, 
China does not comply with the convention which it signed.  
China’s inconsistent behavior endangers these human 
trafficking victims because they are subject to their 
buyer’s treatment, and again face danger when they are 
deported back to North Korea.  For example, the Chinese 
government conducts occasional round-ups of trafficked North 
Koreans and returns them to the North Korean government, 
which then determines a punishment.60  These punishments 
include imprisonment, torture or death.  Those victims 
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facing imprisonment typically are forced to work in North 
Korea’s labor camps, leaving no one exempt.  Man, woman, 
child, young, old, pregnant or disabled, North Korea 
punishes the very victims of human trafficking that the 
government facilitates.  Forced labor camps typically 
provide the North Korean government with services such as 
farming, construction, firewood and brick making.61  
Estimates indicate that the number of North Korean 
internally displaced persons (IDP) ranges from 50,000 to 
250,000.62 
4. Other Illicit Activities 
North Korea is also involved in a number of lower-
profile illicit activities to include missile sales, 
document forging, gambling, illegal fishing, insurance 
fraud, and the trafficking of rhino horns, ivory and 
conflict diamonds.63  The sale of ballistic missiles, 
missile base technology and nuclear-related materials has 
provided North Korea with profits of over $560 million in 
2001.64  However, this figure is on the decline since the 
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inception of the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003, 
designed to intercept such shipments.65  The sale of these 
weapons and related materials are known to have been sold to 
Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Venezuela and 
Vietnam, which threatens regional and U.S. interests if the 
weapons are utilized, or further proliferated to other rogue 
nations or non-state actors.66 
North Korea’s involvement in illicit activities has 
surfaced over the past few decades in a number of incidents 
involving North Korean diplomats stationed at overseas 
consulates and embassies.  In addition to diplomats being 
caught using counterfeit U.S. “supernotes,” as was 
documented in 1989 in Manila, and over $250,000.00 being 
deposited into a Macao bank in 1994,67 diplomats have been 
caught passing forged documents in Belgrade, and were 
apprehended in France en route from Cameroon with 20 
suitcases containing 576 kilograms of ivory tusks.68  
Fraudulent insurance claims filed for death and accidents 
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top over $150 million through British insurance companies.69  
These few examples demonstrate that North Korea utilizes the 
counterfeit U.S. “supernotes” to facilitate other illicit 
activities. 
The following chapter will discuss how North Korea’s 
involvement in illicit activities has been addressed by U.S. 
foreign policy. 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the evolution of U.S. policy 
toward North Korea with a short chronology from the Cold War 
through the present.  In examining these policies, as well 
as the geopolitical situation in the region, it will 
retrospectively attempt to determine if there had been 
signals that North Korea might become involved in illicit 
activities.  It will seek to determine at what point the 
U.S. policy apparatus began looking at illicit activities as 
a threat to regional security and U.S. interests.  Finally, 
this chapter will examine the diplomatic and law enforcement 
measures that have been implemented in reaction to North 
Korea’s illicit activities. 
B. OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA - THE COLD 
WAR ADMINISTRATIONS 
U.S. policy toward North Korea during the Cold War was 
one of containment, beginning with President Truman, whose 
administration brought the United States out of its 
“passive, isolationist stance, to that of an active 
participant.”70  A review of the U.S. national security 
strategy determined that “victory of Communist forces in the 
Chinese Civil War and the successful detonation of an atomic 
weapon by the Soviet Union” posed a threat to U.S. 
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interests.71  What derived from this review was National 
Security Council Paper NSC-68, which would become the most 
important document influencing U.S. foreign policy during 
the Cold War.  NSC-68 recommended a massive build-up of 
conventional and nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet 
threat of communist expansion.  NSC-68 postured the United 
States to contain the Soviet threat through rearmament, 
mobilization, economic and political support to counter 
communist expansion, which would transpire during the Korean 
War, and again during the Vietnam War.  By amplifying both 
weapons and troop strength, Truman increased the defense 
budget three-fold in support of a military build-up against 
communism.72  This phenomenon would continue throughout the 
Cold War, most notably during the Reagan administration. 
The United States’ interest to limit Soviet influence 
on the Korean peninsula after World War II created a Korea 
halved by ideologically polarized powers and influences, 
which would erupt into the Korean War only a few years 
later.  While the armistice created a tense peace that has 
lasted until the present, North Korea’s stressful 
provocations threatened regional stability throughout the 
Cold War.  These incidents include the capture of the USS 
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1969, the shoot-down of Korean Air Lines flight 858 in 1988, 
as well as multiple altercations at the demilitarized 
zone.73   
The Cold War’s most threatening development was that of 
nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
which contributed to stress in the region as North Korea 
began researching atomic energy in the 1960s with Soviet 
support.74  This development came in response to the United 
States posturing nuclear weapons against the North, from 
South Korea as of 1957.75  It would not be until 1985 that 
President Reagan’s foreign policy efforts would result in 
North Korea’s signature to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).  However, compliance to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safety conditions were 
violated, and threats of withdrawal and inspection refusals 
occurred during and beyond the Cold War.  The last U.S. 
leader during the Cold War, President G. H. W. Bush, led the 
withdrawal of the last of the remaining nuclear weapons from 
the Korean peninsula in 1991,76 but this would not stop 
North Korea from further developing nuclear weapons and 
intercontinental ballistic weapons for not only itself, but 
to proliferate to other rogue nations and non-state actors.   
                     
73 “U.S. – North Korean Relations Timeline: 1853-2006,” British 
American Security Information Council, October 19, 2006, 
http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/northkorea-chronology.htm (accessed July 
20, 2007). 
74 Steven Aftergood, Hans M. Kristensen, ”Nuclear Weapons Program,” 
Federation of American Scientists, November 16, 2006, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html (accessed September 
27, 2007). 
75 “U.S. – North Korean Relations Timeline: 1853-2006,” British 
American Security Information Council, October 19, 2006, 




C. OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA DURING THE 
CLINTON AND G. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS 
The changes on the geopolitical front that emerged 
after the fall of the Soviet Union presented both 
opportunities and challenges for U.S. foreign policy 
measures toward North Korea.  At the end of the Cold War, 
North Korea lost the Soviet financial and ideological 
support that had aligned it with the communist bloc.  This 
loss, coupled with North Korea’s natural disasters of the 
1990s, created both a financial and human disaster for the 
ideologically isolated country.   
Previous U.S. administrations had built up both 
military and weapons defenses for decades against the Cold 
War’s nuclear threat, and applied policies geared toward 
containment.  However, the new challenges facing North Korea 
would require a different approach to lure North Korea into 
the international community and away from the development of 
nuclear weapons.  While responses to this challenge have 
evolved with limited success, post-Cold War U.S. 
administrations have taken, and are taking, very divergent 
policy approaches toward North Korea. 
The Clinton administration was faced with an 
increasingly belligerent North Korea that only 
intermittently cooperated with the guidelines of the NPT.  
North Korea refused to allow inspectors into the country, 
and when it did, it forced inspectors to work by 
flashlight.77  North Korea also underreported its inventory 
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and threatened that economic sanctions equate to a 
declaration of war.78  President Clinton’s first year in 
office dealt with North Korea ending its denuclearization 
talks with South Korea, continuing its plutonium production, 
and the testing its Nodong missile.79  Despite this 
behavior, the Clinton administration assured North Korea 
that “it will not take military action against it or 
interfere with its internal affairs,”80 yet made it very 
clear that if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, that 
it would “be the end of their country."81   
Despite North Korea’s provocative behavior, the Clinton 
administration targeted North Korea’s isolation as a chance 
to shift U.S. foreign policy from a Cold War containment 
strategy to a moderate, engagement approach.  North Korea 
was presented benefits and opportunities in exchange for its 
cooperation, with offers of financial, food and energy aid, 
as well as bilateral dialogue.   
One of the most notable achievements of the Clinton 
administration was the Agreed Framework, established in 
October 1994, just months after the death of Kim Il Sung.  
The Agreed Framework presented North Korea with the 
                     
78 “North Korea Nuclear/Missile Chronology - 1962-2000,” The 
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Volume 6 Number 6 (November-
December 2000), http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/nkorea/nuke-
miss-chron.htm (accessed September 27, 2007). 
79 Ibid. 
80 “U.S. – North Korean Relations Timeline: 1853-2006,” British 
American Security Information Council, October 19, 2006, 
http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/northkorea-chronology.htm (accessed July 
20, 2007). 
81 Paul F. Horvitz, “Nuclear Arms ‘Cannot Be Allowed’ In Pyongyang's 
Control, He Asserts: Clinton Warns North Korea Against Attack on the 
South,” International Herald Tribune, November 8, 1993, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/1993/11/08/kor_4.php (accessed September 27, 
2007). 
 34
opportunity for normalized diplomatic and economic 
relations, conditional upon its adherence to the Framework’s 
guidelines.  This opportunity offered the provision and 
financing of proliferation-resistant light water reactors to 
North Korea for the exclusive purpose of “peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy,”82 in exchange for its cooperation to shut 
down its plutonium program.83  It also provided assurances 
that the United States would not threaten or use nuclear 
weapons against North Korea.84  While the Agreed Framework 
did establish guidelines toward denuclearization, as well as 
provide a stepping stone from a bilateral to multilateral 
forum that would become the Six-Party Talks by 2002, it 
broke down in 2003 when North Korea withdrew from the NPT. 
85 
A later product of the Clinton Administration was the 
establishment of a North Korea Policy Coordinator in 1998, 
and the appointment of Dr. William J. Perry to that 
position.86  In 1999, William Perry produced the Perry 
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Report, which established two options in dealing with North 
Korea’s myriad of problems in order of importance:  nuclear 
weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical and biological 
weapons, conventional arms, political issues and human 
rights.87  The Perry Report presented two options that North 
Korea could pursue, based on their compliance or lack 
thereof; being “peaceful coexistence,” or “increasing 
animosity” at the other end of the spectrum.88 
Perhaps the late establishment of the Perry Report 
contributed to stagnation in the resolution of the North 
Korea problem.  Because it took an entire administration to 
provide North Korea with the two options it would face 
depending on its level of cooperation, it gave North Korea 
time to contemplate its next move.  North Korea’s 
fluctuating level of cooperation and commitment to programs 
and treaties resulted in the Clinton administration being 
blamed for allowing North Korea to repeatedly blackmail the 
United States.   
Regarding North Korea’s illicit activities, the Clinton 
administration placed more attention on the nuclear issue to 
prevent the further testing and development of missiles and 
weapons, as it was a more imminent threat to regional 
security.  Consequently, the 1999 Perry Report does not even 
mention illicit activities in its findings and 
recommendations for the review of U.S. policy toward North 
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Korea.89  It would not be until the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, that any significant headway would be 
made in targeting the illicit financial transactions of 
those countries named in the “axis of evil.” 
Despite a change to a Republican administration, the G. 
W. Bush administration has not been able to lure North Korea 
into compliance with international standards.  Where the 
Clinton administration made a strong effort to engage North 
Korea diplomatically and financially, making it the highest 
recipient of U.S. aid in Asia,90 the Bush administration 
began with an opposite, hardliner approach.  While 
engagement was such a strong policy of the Clinton 
administration, that former Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright made a visit to North Korea,91 the Bush 
administration refused to have any bilateral dealings with 
the country.  Instead, the G. W. Bush administration revised 
North Korea policy according to its preference for a 
multilateral approach.  In contrast to the Clinton 
administration’s policies, the following excerpt summarizes 
the Bush administration’s reversal of those moderate 
approaches: 
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The thesis underlying a new approach to North 
Korea is that the United States must alter the 
balance of power in negotiations – that rewarding 
cessation of bad behavior (“carrots”) has failed, 
and that disincentives (“sticks”) to such 
behavior must be included in any new negotiations 
for them to have any hope of producing acceptable 
results. U.S. bargaining power must exceed that 
of North Korea in order to compel North Korea to 
dismantle its nuclear and weapons programs and to 
abide by its agreements. To achieve this 
advantage in the negotiations, the United States 
must be prepared to end all U.S. aid to North 
Korea under the Agreed Framework, reimpose 
sanctions lifted in 1999, and impose a quarantine 
to cut off its supply of hard currency and stop 
its weapons proliferation activity.92 
While North Korea has been involved in illicit 
activities since the 1970s, the country has only faced 
economic sanctions, which stops legitimate financial 
transactions, and did not focus on precluding the country 
from becoming involved in illicit activities.  The 
difference in regard to illicit activities between the 
Clinton and Bush administrations is that the G. W. Bush 
administration specifically addressed illicit activities, 
particularly smuggling and counterfeiting, in the revision 
of U.S. policy toward North Korea.93 
While the Bush administration took an immediate tough 
approach on a number of programs, it has had to scale back 
its hardliner rhetoric to foster cooperation not only with 
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North Korea, but the region.  For example, Bush was 
initially very critical of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy 
that provides legitimate financial opportunities and 
peninsular stability.  Whereas South Korea is hoping to 
foster cooperative behavior by North Korea through 
engagement, the G. W. Bush administration criticized its 
efforts despite its own refusal to deal bilaterally with 
North Korea.  Further, President Bush’s name calling of 
North Korea as the “axis of evil,” “an oppressive regime,” 
“an outpost of tyranny,” and a “shameless charlatan” did not 
help to encourage North Korea’s level of cooperation with 
the United States.94  Consequently, after such accusations, 
North Korea withdrew from negotiations.95  The G. W. Bush 
administration has begun to cautiously shift its policy to a 
slightly more engaging approach by sending Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Christopher Hill to North Korea in 2007 to discuss the 
denuclearization issue.96 
In order to counter North Korea’s efforts to engage in 
illicit activities that fund its weapons program, the United 
States has developed several law enforcement programs that 
function multilaterally.  The following section will review 
the United States policy response toward North Korea’s 
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illicit activities, and will address those law enforcement 
initiatives established by the Bush administration. 
D. U.S. POLICY RESPONSES TO NORTH KOREA’S ILLICIT 
ACTIVITIES 
The discussions in Chapter I explain the debate between 
hardliners and moderates, and their suggested approaches on 
how to deal with North Korea.  The hardliners argue that a 
tough stance toward North Korea necessitates continued 
sanctions, and recommends no bilateral meetings until North 
Korea comes into compliance with international standards.  
The moderates argue that a bilateral approach is necessary 
in order to get North Korea to join the international 
community in a legitimate manner.  The following discussions 
on U.S. policy responses will describe the types of 
diplomatic and law enforcement approaches that have occurred 
in response to North Korea’s illicit activities. 
1. Diplomatic Responses 
Diplomatic measures have been applied through a number 
of means in order to lure North Korea away from its illicit 
activities.  The United States has offered over $1 billion 
in food, oil and financial assistance from 1995-2003.97 
South Korea and Japan similarly contribute assistance to 
North Korea, but China stands as the leading contributor of 
food aid to North Korea.98  However, each country’s aid 
forms are accompanied by denuclearization and security 
conditions which North Korea must satisfy in order to 
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qualify for continued assistance, which each have taken 
their turn in suspending aid until North Korea cooperates 
with those conditions.99  North Korea has also been offered 
regional trade opportunities, with one such prospect being 
the Kaesong industrial complex, located north of the 
demilitarized zone, which could potentially enable North 
Korea to improve its financial situation, thus reducing its 
need to rely on illicit activities. 
South Korea has pursued diplomacy through a trade 
approach with North Korea over the past decade by adapting 
to the threat that the North presents militarily, as well as 
financially.  Like China, invasion or reunification would 
present a huge financial challenge to the South.  Therefore, 
South Korea has taken an interactive, interdependent 
approach to diminishing the chance that North Korea would 
destroy its own financial future by employing nuclear 
weapons that it has built through illicit funds.  This trade 
plan was initiated by Kim Dae Jung as the Sunshine Policy, 
which separates politics and economics, promotes interaction 
and economic assistance, and works toward three 
principles.100  These principles include that armed 
provocation will not be tolerated, that the South will not 
attempt to absorb the North, and that the South seeks to 
cooperate with North Korea.101  The Sunshine Policy trade 
initiative has developed from a cooperative foreign policy 
approach, to an economically interdependent financial 
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policy.  Not only has it developed tourism between the two 
countries with the Mt. Kumgang resort area, it has developed 
an industrial complex in Kaesong, which by 2012, hopes to 
employ 700,000 North Koreans.102  The Kaesong industrial 
complex lies just 6 miles north of the demilitarized zone 
and will host nearly 250 South Korean companies, which 
provide their own infrastructure to include power, supplies, 
and a market where these goods would be sold.103  While some 
critics claim that the South Korean government is too 
conciliatory toward the North, it does create a sense of 
economic interdependence and provides South Korea with a 
close, inexpensive manufacturing and production base with 
its North Korean neighbors.   
South Korea’s economic engagement with North Korea is a 
means to encourage the country’s development and hopeful 
cooperation on diplomatic issues, which is slowly being 
achieved.  Most recently, the North-South Summit in October 
2007 produced positive results, as North Korea agreed to 
work toward a permanent peace solution, as well as resolve 
other important peninsular issues to include joint fishing 
areas and economic zones.104 
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2. Law Enforcement Responses 
A number of law enforcement programs were developed and 
initiated in 2003 as a result of North Korea’s illicit 
activities, which have garnered negative publicity since the 
late 1990s.  Initiatives were developed to target the 
illicit activities, from the actual counterfeited goods, to 
the money, and to the financial institutions that facilitate 
illicit transactions.  While the programs currently in place 
originated from a U.S. policy initiative, the cooperation of 
countries in the region is increasing in a multilateral 
effort to curb North Korea’s illicit activities. 
In 2003, the Bush administration designed the Illicit 
Activities Initiative in an effort to disable North Korea’s 
involvement in criminal activity.  The initiative targets 
the money gained from the sale of goods to include drugs, 
narcotics, counterfeit U.S. currency, cigarettes and 
pharmaceuticals.  The initiative is comprised of more than 
100 law enforcement officials, fourteen U.S. government 
agencies, fifteen foreign governments, and has individual 
committees which are dedicated to each type of illicit 
activity that North Korea conducts.105  In an effort to 
target counterfeit and/or laundered monies, the Secret 
Service has conducted training and seminars in 23 countries 
to train financial institutions and law enforcement 
groups.106   
                     
105 Edward R. Royce, “Gangster Regime:  How North Korea Counterfeits 
Unites States Currency,” United States House of Representatives, March 
12, 2007, 16. 
106 Todd Bullock, “Narcotics, Counterfeiting Help Fund North Korea, 
U.S. Says,” United States Department of State, April 26, 2006, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2006/Apr/26-294718.html (accessed 
June 1, 2007). 
 43
Section 311 of the Patriot Act, which targets banks 
involved in the facilitation of terrorism against the United 
States, is what allowed for the three-year investigation 
which led to the freezing of $24 million of North Korean 
assets.107  Banco Delta Asia in Macao has been managing 
North Korea’s accounts for over 20 years, and was discovered 
to be facilitating money laundering by allowing deposits of 
counterfeit U.S. currency transactions deriving from illicit 
activities.108  The freezing of these assets angered North 
Korea, resulting in its withdrawal from the Six Party Talks.  
However, because of the financial dilemma that the freeze 
created for North Korea, the country agreed to come back to 
the negotiation table if the funds were unfrozen.   
While the freeze temporarily blocked North Korea from 
continuing its activities, it did succeed in sending a clear 
message to countries and banks around the world that 
facilitating illicit transactions and monies has serious 
consequences.  Regional reactions to the Banco Delta Asia 
freeze resulted in China, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, 
Mongolia, Thailand and Singapore suspending financial 
transactions with North Korea.109  Additionally, the Bank of 
China suspended its own Macau branch from conducting 
business with North Korea because of suspicions that North 
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Korea was counterfeiting Chinese Yuan.110  Because of the 
freeze, Banco Delta Asia “reportedly lost a third of its 
deposits in six days,” which confirms the severe 
implications of conducting illicit transaction for North 
Korea.111 
The Proliferation Security Initiative was implemented 
on May 31, 2003, and is designed to target the shipment and 
trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related 
materials.112  Inspecting suspicious ships enables law 
enforcement agencies in the region to search for the goods 
and products that contribute to North Korea’s illicit 
activities. The Proliferation Security Initiative is a 
multilateral approach which seeks to limit North Korea’s 
potential to traffic the goods which contribute to the 
country’s weapons program.  It began with eleven member 
countries, with additional countries endorsing the program.  
However, the only countries in the Asia-Pacific region that 
became signatories are Japan and Australia.113  The lack of 
Asian cooperation to the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
namely China and South Korea, creates a gap in enforcement 
and limits the Initiative’s potential success.114 
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The Container Security Initiative (CSI), developed in 
2003, targets sea cargo bound for United States, with the 
“primary purpose to protect the global trading system and 
the trade lanes between CSI ports and the United States.”115  
The difference between this program and typical cargo 
inspections is that the Container Security Initiative moves 
the location of inspection outward, inspecting cargo before 
it arrives at U.S. ports.  While the Container Security 
Initiative screens for potentially dangerous materials or 
illicit goods bound for the United States, it is limited 
only to U.S. ports.  Fifty-two ports around the world now 
have their own similar container security program, which 
enhances the success of discovering weapons and illicit 
goods that are bound for those countries.116  However, the 
overall success of a global security container initiative is 
limited because more countries have not yet implemented such 
programs.117 
Beyond the law enforcement programs initiated by the 
United States, the United Nations has also taken steps to 
curb North Korea’s illicit activities.  North Korea’s 
nuclear test in October 2006 resulted in a unanimous vote to 
implement United Nations Resolution 1718, which inspects 
cargo for nuclear and conventional weapons, luxury items, 
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and can freeze the assets of North Korean officials.118  
While this resolution does not prevent North Korea from 
engaging economically with other countries, it does seek to 
hinder its ability to procure materials that could be used 
in the production of nuclear weapons, as well as materials 
that could potentially support counterfeiting or other 
illicit operations.   
The United States has developed a combination of 
diplomatic and law enforcement responses that are designed 
to hinder North Korea’s ability to continue and further its 
involvement in illicit activities.  While these programs 
have the potential to seriously curb illicit activities, 
multilateral cooperation will be needed for the programs to 
reach their full potential.  The following section will 
analyze how North Korea’s illicit activities affect the 
region, and will assess U.S. policy options to further 
develop these diplomatic and law enforcement programs. 
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 IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NORTH KOREA’S ILLICIT 
ACTIVITIES AND U.S POLICY OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the far-reaching security 
implications of North Korea’s involvement in illicit 
activities, analyzing the security, economic and social 
ramifications on North Korea, the region, and U.S. 
interests.  It will then analyze the options available to 
U.S. policy makers in dealing with these activities. 
B. THE EFFECTS OF NORTH KOREA’S ILLICIT ACTIVITES ON 
NORTHEAST ASIA’S SECURITY 
The implications of North Korea’s illicit activities 
involve security, economic and social threats that affect 
Northeast Asia and U.S. interests. 
1. Security  
The regional security threat that evolves from North 
Korea’s illicit activities is that the resulting profits 
fund the country’s ability to conduct research and 
development for its nuclear program.  The region’s fear is 
that North Korea will then incorporate these technologies to 
produce nuclear weapons technology.  These products could 
pose a threat if used by North Korea, or if they are 
trafficked to rogue nations or non-state actors that could 
potentially threaten regional and U.S. security interests. 
North Korea has validated the region’s fears through 
its various examples of belligerent behavior.  For example, 
in 2006, it conducted Taepodong II long-range missile tests, 
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and in 1998,119 conducted a Taepodong I long-range missile 
test that over flew Northern Japan.120  North Korea’s 
missile tests are significant because it is not a member of 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to 
restrict the proliferation of missiles that could carry 
weapons of mass destruction.  These missile tests, whether 
they are conducted for testing purposes or as a retaliatory 
media stunt, displays to prospective buyers the missile’s 
operational capabilities.  The proliferation of missile 
technology and operational missiles carries great 
consequences because they could be sold to rogue nations or 
non-state actors that could upset regional and international 
security. 
More specific to Northeast Asia was how North Korea’s 
missile tests upset Japan’s security posture.  Because the 
missiles passed over its territory, Japan feels the most 
threatened, perhaps because of the historical animosity 
between the two countries, but also because it does not know 
if those missiles could have been aimed at the Japanese 
mainland.  Japan responded to the missile tests by not only 
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million in 2005 for North Korea’s already fragile economy, 
but by fortifying the U.S. – Japan Alliance to protect the 
region.121   
2. Economic 
The economic threat that illicit activities pose 
extends far beyond Northeast Asia.  For example, the 
implications of counterfeiting U.S. currency can affect the 
stability of the U.S. dollar, as well as the integrity of 
the banking systems through which the monies pass.  Among 
the $730 billion worth of U.S. currency that circulates 
through U.S. and foreign banks worldwide, only a small 
fraction of this money is believed to be counterfeited.  
However, the suspicion that arises from increased 
counterfeiting can also challenge the integrity of the 
currency.122   
Banks fearing the acceptance of counterfeit 
“supernotes,” has resulted in some countries refusing the 
receipt of $100 bills, as occurred Taiwan in 2004, and Peru 
in 2005.123  The counterfeiting of U.S. currency can 
destabilize confidence in the U.S. dollar, depress its 
value, and cause banks to either not accept the bills, or 
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impose fees on bank customers to change the money.  
Additionally, the United States must continually change the 
design of the bills to make counterfeiting more difficult.  
The “resigning, printing, introducing and removing old 
notes” from the currency inventory comes at a heavy cost to 
the U.S. government.124  Beyond the counterfeiting of U.S. 
currency, cigarettes and pharmaceuticals counterfeiting 
violates product patents, as well as places a risk on the 
jobs of workers producing genuine products.   
3. Social  
The social ramifications of North Korea’s illicit 
activities are more widespread, in that it could potentially 
touch the lives of nearly anyone in the world.  Anyone that 
ingests a counterfeit pharmaceutical, smokes a counterfeit 
cigarette, facilitates a transaction based on counterfeit 
U.S. currency, or consumes the opium, heroin, 
methamphetamines or ecstasy that North Korea produces and 
exports are propagating the regime.   
Perhaps the most tragic implication of North Korea’s 
illicit activities is the impact on the North Koreans 
themselves, and the human rights abuses they face both at 
home and in the hands of human traffickers.  For those North 
Koreans trafficked into China, they continually endure human 
rights violations, and even more so when China deports them 
back to North Korea to face whatever punishment awaits them 
upon their return. 
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Within North Korea, the population faces food shortages 
and malnutrition because their government diverts land and 
resources that could be used for food production for the 
production of drugs.  It could also be assumed that North 
Korea is diverting any technology that could potentially 
improve the economy and the quality of life is similarly 
being diverted to the production of missile technology and 
supporting other illicit activities.  
The social implications of North Korea’s illicit 
activities also affect both China and South Korea because 
North Koreans defect to each country in search of a better 
life.  The U.S. Department of State estimates that China 
accommodates 30,000 – 50,000 North Koreans,125 while South 
Korea has 1,000 North Koreans crossing the border each 
year.126  Vietnam has become a safe haven for North Korean 
defectors which resulted in a transfer of 450 defectors to 
South Korea in 2004.127  The migration of North Korean 
refugees in turn creates a burden on those respective 
economies because they have to absorb them into their social 
infrastructure. 
C. POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are a number of policy options available to U.S. 
policymakers, depending upon where on the moderate to hard 
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line spectrum an administration positions itself.  These 
options include maintaining the status quo, further 
developing programs already in place, encouraging further 
involvement of countries and organizations, and the 
application of aggressive options, such as expanded 
sanctions, aid cuts and asset freezes.  Striking an 
effective balance of diplomacy, law enforcement and 
bilateral and multilateral engagement is the challenge 
facing U.S. foreign and defense policy toward North Korea. 
1. Status Quo  
Maintaining the status quo is one option that could be 
pursued by the United States.  However, the success or 
failure of the measures that have been applied thus far can 
be subjectively argued depending on whether one supports 
either a hardliner or a moderate approach.  Along the lines 
of a moderate approach, the diplomatic and law enforcement 
approaches that have slowly engaged North Korea are 
beginning to show signs of success and possible 
declearization.  The Bush administration’s gradual shift to 
a more engaging policy toward North Korea could encourage 
North Korea to cooperate in the denuclearization process, 
thus precluding its need to pursue illicit activities.  
However, the hardliner position argues that because illicit 
activities are still occurring and thus funding North 
Korea’s nuclear program and the regime, that the diplomatic 
and law enforcement approaches have not been successful in 
prompting regime change or denuclearization.   
While dialogue occurs at the negotiation table of the 
Six Party Talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program, bilateral and multilateral dialogue with North 
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Korea regarding its illicit activities have largely been 
ignored.  Whereas offers of aid and energy assistance are an 
incentive for North Korea to denuclearize, no incentives to 
discontinue illicit activities have been presented, with the 
exception of the freezing of its assets in Macao.  However, 
because North Korea was able to convince the United States 
to unfreeze these funds in exchange for continued dialogue 
regarding the shut down of the Yongbyon reactor, North Korea 
knows how to manipulate the United States’ law enforcement 
program.128 While some Six Party Talks sidebars have 
occurred between China, South Korea and Japan with North 
Korea, the region as a whole does not appear to have 
collectively approached the North Korean government itself 
about illicit activities.  With the exception of the Banco 
Delta Asia investigation that froze and unfroze North 
Korea’s funds, which coincided with North Korea’s threat not 
to return to the Six Party Talks, North Korea has been 
difficult to accurately track and effectively punish. 
2. Development of Programs 
An option that looks beyond the status quo option is to 
further develop the law enforcement programs already in 
place.  Among the programs that exist, to include the 
Illicit Activities Initiative, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, and the cargo 
searches resulting from United Nations Resolution 1781, more 
resources need to be aggressively devoted to these law 
enforcement efforts.  While more inspections could lead to 
more seizures, leading to the disengagement of the 
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international crime network that facilitate the activities, 
a potential key to success could be to recruit more 
countries as signatories to the programs.  Because North 
Korea’s illicit activities are perceived as a law 
enforcement issue, diplomatic policy could shift its 
perception of the problem, and encourage the law enforcement 
agencies’ involvement in its diplomatic dealings.  Without 
support on the diplomatic front, the law enforcement 
agencies of countries in the region will not have the 
support they need to develop programs.  Additionally, the 
governments involved need to address the issues in their own 
countries that create the demand for the illicit products 
supplied and trafficked by North Korea. 
The challenge that the Illicit Activities Initiative 
faces is that of resistance to its law enforcement 
investigations.  This discouraged North Korea from 
participating in the Six Party Talks, when it refused to 
participate in further talks until its assets in Banco Delta 
Asia were unfrozen.129  Another weakness of the Illicit 
Activities Initiative is that it is managed by career 
Foreign Service Officers at the Korea Desk of the State 
Department, which essentially diminishes its importance 
because it is not being promoted by prominent political 
appointees.130  Recommendations to resolve these two issues 
are that proper financial and personnel resources be devoted 
to enable the initiative to succeed, as well as allowing 
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access to the decision-makers that can appoint the proper 
government agencies to become involved.131 
A positive result of Section 311 of the Patriot Act is 
that banks around the world paid close attention to the 
consequences that Banco Delta Asia faced.  This incident 
further isolated North Korea from the international 
financial community, which indicates that Section 311 should 
be continued, as well as expanded in its tracking, 
investigations and punishment of accomplice banks.   
3. Encourage Involvement 
Perhaps the most important factor in collectively 
disabling North Korea’s illicit activities is regional 
involvement.  While U.S. foreign policy will likely continue 
to support diplomatic and law enforcement programs, 
effectively sharing these ideas and programs with countries 
in the region could make the difference.  The following 
factors are ideas that both the United States and the region 
should consider: 
a. Look Inward 
A policy option that could curb the demand for 
North Korea’s illicit products is to encourage governments 
to look inward at their own problems, such as drug 
addiction, China’s one-child policy, female infanticide, and 
the demand for illegal goods such as ivory, conflict 
diamonds and rhino horns.  In order to stop North Korea from 
producing, trafficking and supplying the region with illicit 
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goods, the demand for those products in the recipient 
countries needs to be addressed.  The social issues that 
create the demand, as well as the criminal elements that act 
as the middleman between the North Korean suppliers need to 
be addressed and resolved. 
b. Utilize International and Regional 
Organizations 
International organizations could become more 
involved, such as the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission, which could press North Korea to allow Human 
Rights monitors to assess the internal situation.   In line 
with a human rights issue, China signed the United Nations 
Convention for the Status of Refugees in 1951, with which it 
seldom complies, sending trafficked North Koreans back to 
their country to face punishment.  China could be encouraged 
to not only adhere to this convention, but be encouraged to 
comply with human trafficking laws as well as address its 
own social and economic issues which create the demand for 
North Koreans to fill those gaps.   
Regional organizations such as ASEAN could be more 
aggressive in addressing North Korea’s activities.  Thus 
far, an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting has only discussed its 
discontent with illicit activities without North Korea being 
present at the Forum.132 
The United Nations International Narcotic Control 
Board could be more aggressive in tapping into crime rings 
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which work with North Korea to facilitate transactions by 
ensuring that countries adhere to international treaties.  
Current U.S. policy to counter the trafficking of drugs 
focuses on training and institution building to disable 
Taiwan from being a transit point for North Korean drugs.133  
Additionally, the 2004 reopening of the North Korean embassy 
in Mongolia is of interest because of the possibility that 
its diplomats could use it as a drug trafficking hub as it 
had in the past.134  
The Six Party Talks and its member countries could 
invite North Korea for sidebar meetings to discuss its 
illicit activities.  While the Six Party Talks originally 
was formulated to deal with North Korea’s nuclear issues, it 
has become a stepping stone to bilateral and trilateral 
sidebar talks, offering a “broad number of configurations” 
which “offers us the flexibility to mix and match as we need 
to develop ideas, to develop approaches” to the Six Party 
process.135    
The international financial community should also 
become more involved in disabling North Korea from 
facilitating illicit activities.  For example, international 
banking institutions should exercise more integrity in their 
relationships with North Korean banks.  The international 
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financial community should be aware that North Korea 
utilizes its diplomatic missions as a means to conduct 
illicit activities. North Korean diplomats stationed at 
overseas consulates and embassies should therefore be 
monitored.  Additionally, North Korean trading and shipping 
companies should similarly be monitored as they are utilized 
as front companies to ship illicit goods.136 
International law enforcement initiatives, such as 
the Proliferation Security Initiative should seek to 
encourage the participation of North Korea’s neighboring key 
countries.  China and South Korea are currently not members 
of the Proliferation Security Initiative, which limits the 
potential success of the program.137  While China does not 
support the proliferation of weapons, it is known that other 
illicit activities are largely ignored along the North 
Korean – Chinese border.138  South Korea’s cooperation is 
also needed, but pressuring North Korea with the program is 
viewed as too harsh.139  Additionally, the sharing of 
valuable intelligence and data about North Korea’s illicit 
activities could better support law enforcement programs. 
4. Assertive Options 
While most of the aforementioned policy options have 
been implemented to at least some degree, North Korea 
continues to adapt to the measures that have been placed 
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against it.  More assertive options to include sanctions, 
aid cuts, and asset freezes have been placed against North 
Korea, but have not resulted in completely preventing North 
Korea from profiting from illicit activities.  Instead, 
North Korea shifts its activities to new ones that were not 
previously under investigation, such as its shift from heavy 
poppy production to counterfeit cigarettes after the seizure 
of the Pong Su incident.140  While assertive options would 
conceivably be more effective, North Korea has been very 
successful at forcing the international community to bend to 
its demands in order to gain its participation in the Six 
Party Talks.  In order to gain North Korea’s full attention, 
a complete withdrawal of aid, or expanded sanctions could be 
an option, but may produce an irrational reaction by North 
Korea, or produce a human disaster resulting in mass 
migration to South Korea or China. 
Another assertive option could involve the United 
States indicting North Korean leaders for their involvement 
with drug smuggling and U.S. currency counterfeiting.  In 
line with U.S. currency counterfeiting, the United States 
could “go on record condemning North Korea’s illicit 
activities,” in denouncing North Korea’s counterfeiting 
activities as economic warfare against the United States.141 
The aforementioned policy options describe steps that 
U.S. foreign policy could follow to curb North Korea’s 
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involvement in illicit activities.  The conclusion will 
assess why it has taken the U.S. foreign policy apparatus 




North Korea’s involvement in illicit activities to fund 
its nuclear program presents a security threat to the region 
and U.S. interests.  The estimated $1 billion it earns 
annually from trafficking drugs, missiles, counterfeit 
cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, and other illicit goods 
collectively contribute to destabilizing the region.   
There are two types of approaches that the United 
States and the region have applied to the problem, which 
fall into the diplomatic and law enforcement arenas.  
Neither has been entirely successful, which creates a debate 
between which approach may or may not work better, or if one 
should be pursued more than the other.  Because North Korea 
has been successful at forcing the international community 
to bend to its demands, neither approach has entirely 
worked, or will work unless a different approach or 
combination of them is taken.   
While the various law enforcement programs could have 
the potential to succeed, they are still in their infancy, 
and will require more signatories in the region.  Without 
regional involvement and cooperation, North Korea is 
unlikely to feel enough pressure to cease its illicit 
activities. 
While the aforementioned reasons look to the future on 
how to curb North Korea’s illicit activities, to be 
addressed in section B, the following factors look to the  
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past.  The subsequent factors are attributed to why it took 
the United States three decades to directly target North 
Korea’s activities: 
1. Containment of Communism Focus 
The general foreign policy of the United States 
throughout the Cold War was one of containment.  U.S. 
foreign policy toward North Korea was focused on maintaining 
peace on the peninsula, as well as addressing North Korea’s 
rising nuclear concern.  While it was during the Cold War 
that North Korea became involved in illicit activities, the 
potential threat of those illicit activities on the region 
and U.S. interests could not compete with the spread of 
communism and the growing nuclear threat. 
2. Nuclear Threat Focus 
United States foreign policy toward North Korea after 
the Cold War has been heavily focused on negotiating the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  The U.S. 
withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea was a hopeful 
example for North Korea to follow.  However, a majority of 
U.S. foreign policy focus revolved around the Agreed 
Framework, and keeping North Korea not only at the 
negotiation table, but in compliance with the IAEA standards 
of the NPT.  More recent U.S. foreign policy focus involves 
keeping North Korea at the negotiation table of the Six 
Party Talks, as well as strengthening U.S. relations with 
other member governments of the multilateral dialogue.   
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3. Natural and Human Disaster Focus  
 During the 1990s, multiple natural disasters of 
droughts and floods produced human disasters of famine and 
internally displaced peoples, which focused U.S. attention 
on humanitarian and development aid.  Because these natural 
and human disasters also created a financial disaster for 
the North Korean government, it was during this time that it 
increased its involvement in illicit activities to not only 
sustain itself, but maintain legitimacy with the population.  
The United States’ focus on sustaining a stable Korean 
peninsula through aid perhaps diverted attention from how 
North Korea was financially sustaining itself through 
illicit activities.   
Again, the more immediate threat of a nuclear North 
Korea, coupled with the potential for a huge migration of 
North Koreans into South Korea or China trumped the threat 
of illicit activities. 
4. Underestimation of the Threat of Illicit Funds 
North Korea’s resourcefulness was underestimated, and 
while it was known that North Korea was involved in illicit 
activities, it may not have been strongly suspected or 
confirmed that these funds were being funneled into its 
nuclear program, or that they presented a threat to regional 
stability or U.S. interests.  Prior to the implementation of 
Section 311 of the Patriot Act, North Korea’s illicit 
activities had not been aggressively addressed in diplomatic 
discussions, or tracked through law enforcement activities 
or discussions by either the United States or North Korea’s 
Asian neighbors.  Because these illicit activities went 
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either unchecked or were a low priority, in particular, its 
financial transactions, it was not known how intricately 
their existence had infiltrated mainstream banking and 
trading systems.  In the example of the Banco Delta Asia 
asset freeze, it took a three-year investigation to amass 
the web of accounts that would be linked to illicit 
transactions. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aforementioned points about the past describe 
reasons why the United States did not perceive North Korea’s 
illicit activities as an imminent enough threat to implement 
policy against them.  The following list describes policy 
recommendations that could diminish the threat of such 
activities from further affecting regional security and U.S. 
interests: 
1. Regional Participation  
The diplomatic and law enforcement approaches discussed 
in Chapter III have each led to some level of success in at 
least raising regional awareness to the North Korean illicit 
activities issues.  However, a policy better integrating 
diplomatic and law enforcement measures would better enable 
the United States and the region to use one approach to push 
the other.  For example, because South Korea and China are 
not participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
the success of this program is limited without their 
support.  Beyond law enforcement programs, continuing to 
build strong U.S. – China and U.S. - Japan bilateral 
relationships is imperative to keeping North Korea at the 
negotiation table.  Moreover, ensuring that relations 
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between China and Japan are positive is equally important 
because their cooperation stabilizes the entire region.142  
Additionally, encouraging China’s involvement as a 
“responsible stakeholder” in the region indicates to North 
Korea not only that both superpowers want its cooperation, 
but that the United States views China as a true partner in 
the process.143 
2. Threat Perception 
The United States and the region could change the 
perception about the threat that North Korea’s illicit 
activities present to regional security.  The U.S. foreign 
policy apparatus should be taking North Korea’s illicit 
activities as seriously as it does the nuclear program 
because one funds the other.  By placing more emphasis on 
the activities that fund the nuclear program, the region can 
more easily disable its nuclear development by cutting off 
North Korea’s ability fund it through illicit goods.  
Integrating all of the aforementioned options, combined with 
more participation from countries in the region, as well as 
presenting a firm stance toward North Korea could 
demonstrate that the region will not bend to its demands and 
criminal behavior. 
3. Continued Engagement Strategy 
The Bush administrations’ policy shift of engagement 
toward North Korea is beginning to pay dividends as North 
Korea has agreed to disable its nuclear program by the end 
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of 2008.  Despite North Korea’s history of blackmailing the 
United States, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher 
Hill’s October 2007 meeting with North Korea has proven 
successful, at least preliminarily.  The extension of 
incentives to include removing North Korea from the list of 
countries sponsoring terrorism, and offering the possibility 
of normalizing diplomatic and economic relations to North 
Korea could encourage its cooperation.  As of September 
2007, the State Department removed North Korea from its list 
of illicit drug producing countries.144 
This thesis sought to determine why it has taken the 
U.S. foreign policy apparatus three decades to seriously 
address North Korea’s illicit activities.  The conclusion to 
this question can be attributed to the pressing demand for 
U.S. policy focus on issues that diverted it from North 
Korea’s involvement in illicit activities.  These issues 
include the containment of communism, North Korea’s nuclear 
threat, its natural and human disasters, and the 
underestimation of the threat that illicit activities pose 
to regional security. 
Looking to the future, the United States foreign policy 
apparatus should continue an increasingly engaging policy 
toward North Korea in order to encourage its cooperation.  
The principles which have driven U.S. policy toward North 
Korea during the Bush administration that are based on a 
commitment to a diplomatic solution, a multilateral 
approach, and negotiations as a tactic to test North Korea’s 
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seriousness, appear to be paying dividends.145  Despite 
North Korea’s lack of compliance with previous treaties and 
agreements, its most recent cooperation to begin the 
denuclearization process should be considered a positive 
result of the U.S. shift towards engagement, and that the 
economic incentives and the possibility of full diplomatic 
relations could pave the way to genuine cooperation. 
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